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his wife, Defendants, and SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
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vs.

No. 9946
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Defendants and Respondents.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN
ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs, Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,

vs.

No. 9945

RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R. FARRAR,
his wife, Defendants. and SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellaat

vs.

No. 9946

LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN
ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal

INTRODUCTORl"'" S'TA'fE:\IENT
The Rules do not make provision for filing of a
brief in response to an appellant's reply brief. In the
instant case, ho,vever, the appellant has advanced some
arguments in its reply brief which were not and could
not haYe been reasonably anticipated in the respondent's
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original brief. In view of the novelty and importance
of the questions raised it seems appropriate to file a
short brief dealing 'vith the newly raised issues. 'This
brief does not attempt to restate the facts, or to reargue
the questions involved 'vith respect to applicable theories of unlawful detainer or restitution of the premises.
POIN'l, I: THE CROSS .1-\.PPEAL IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
In its reply brief Seagull has challenged the jurisdiction of the court to consider the cross appeal.
Seagull's attack on the Court's jurisdiction appears
to be due to a confusion in the meaning of the terms
"appeal"and "cross appeal." In former Utah practice
the terms meant th~ same thing with regard to procedural requirements, but under modern Utah practice
they do not. Under former practice the qualifying adjective "cross" was used to designate an appeal by a
party who was already a respondent in another appeal
from the same case. The designation was used as a matter of convenience and did not indicate that the cross
appeal was a special procedure that differed from any
other kind of appeal.
The term "cross appeal" under modern practice
both in Utah and other states has a special meaning.
It does not exist as a special procedural technique under
the Federal Rules of Procedure. (Rule 74 (b) of the
Utah Rules is not found in the Federal Rules) .
A cross appeal is a special procedural technique
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that perruits an appellant to seek appellate relief as an
ineident to proceedings already before the revie,ving
court by the appeal of the opposing party. '"fhe proceeding is availnble only where authorized by statute
or procedural rules. 4 ..~1 1n. Jur. 2d, 687 Appeal and
Error § 177.
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of CiYil Procedure the cross appeal did not exist as a separate procedural technique. (See Note under Rule 7 J (b) in \roltnne 9 UC1\, 1953. An exatnination of prior statutes
and the case la \V sho\vs this note to be correct.) \ \rhile
the courts made occasional reference to "cross appeals''
it is clear from both interpretation and discussion that
the tertn cross appeal ,,·as synonotnous both in meaning and requirements with the term "appeal." For an
excellent discussion on this point see Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Company_, (1931} 78 Ut. 39, 300
P. 1040. (Subsequent case la\v, statutes,and procedure
made no changes in the la'v there discussed until the
adoption of the rules in 1949 and their implementation
in 1950.)
Under former la\v, Utah law and procedure recognized only one kind of appeal and the requirements for
appeal fell alike on both the appellant and the respondent. Each, in effect, if he desired to appeal had to meet
the same requirements and to perfect separate appeals.
'fhe teclmique was wasteful of time of the litigants,
tin1e of the court, and was slo,v, tmnecessarily troublesome, duplicative of both time and effort by each litigant, and unnecessarily expensive.
5
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It is clear that the creation of cross appeals in Utah
by the adoption of the Rules is harmonious with the
basic concert and purpose of the rules. That purpose
has been enunciated many times by this Court, and is
nowhere better expressed than in Rule I (a) :
"These rules ... shall be liberally construed
to secure the just_, speedy_, and inexpensive determination of every action.'' (Emphasis added).
The creation of the cross appeal in Utah by Rule
7 4 (b) has the salutary effect of making the determination of action on appeal more just, speedy, and inexpensive than the for1ner procedure with no possibility
of prejudice to the litigants. ( 4 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, at
page 688).
The cross appeal created under the new practice
is merely a simplification of the former procedure which
required the respondent to 1nake a separate appeal. The
new procedural technique is both sound and practical.
It dispenses with notice, bond, and other procedural
technicalities which are admittedly important when a
matter is first appealed, but become merely burdens
unnecessarily imposed when both the parties and the
action are already before the Court.
It is true that the Utah act which enabled the Supreme Court to adopt the Rules {20-2-4.10 UCA 1943,
as amended) carried with it restrictions adopted frorn
the language of the enabling act for the federal rules.
(28 USCA § 732 b_, 7 FCA Title 28 § 732 b.) Such a
restriction was necessary because of the Constitutional
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requirernents of scpuration of po\\·ers, but it clearly
applies to Iuatters that are clearly a question of substantive rights not merely n1atters of procedure. In a
sense, any change of procedure that per1nits a different
kind of procedure ''modifies'' the ''rights of the litigants. rl,he argunlent is especially pernicious under the
instant circtunstances 'vhere Seagull argues that the
\'"an Zyverdens should be denied their right to cross
appeal becau~e the Trail Zyverdcn's have conzplied 1.cith
the l'tl'istiny procedure and thus failed to follrnc the
former different procedure. But Seagull,s argument
is not only unfair; it is also unsound. .1\pplying the
traditional test of substance and procedure enunciated
by the ~-,ederal courts under the Erie doctrine, it can
readily be seen that the outcome of the case on the
1nerits is not going to be affected by a change in time
and manner of filing· additional questions on appeal.
The argun1ent that the enabling act restricted the
po,ver of the Supreme Court to adopt new rules that
did not preserve the antiques of the old procedure is
untenable. Seagull's argument that any change in the
old procedure is beyond the power of this Court because
it ·'abridges,~' '"enlarges," or "modifies" the substantiYe rights of the litigants in this (or any other) case
is not supported by any authority.
The basic attack 'vhich the appellant Seagull makes
on the validity of Rule 7 ~ (b) is that the Supreme
Court has changed the time in "~hich a cross appeal can
be filed. Since there v,·as no such tiling as a cross appeal
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before the Rules, the Rules did not change the time
for filing cross appeals they created it. If Seagull's
attack depends, as it does, on Utah law prior to the
Rules, then it should be directed at the modification of
time made under Rule 73. Seagull seems obsessed ""rith
the thought that Rule 73 which deals with appeals and
not cross appeals applies also to cross appeals. But
Seagull is understandably silent jn attacking the reduction of time from 90 days allowed by the procedure
just prior to the rules to the one month (not the 30
days of the Federal Rules) permitted by the Utah
Rules. The time for appeals has been changed several
times in Utah procedure. It has been as high as one
year and as short as one month. The inconsistency of
Seagull's argument is apparent. If "changing" the
time for cross appeals under Rule 74 (b) "modifies"
substantive rights, then the actual change of time for
appeals under Rule 73 (a) must also ~'modify" substantive rights. 'l,hat is particularly true in the instant
case. The Van Zyverden's have complied with the requirements of the 74 (b) for a cross appeal. If that
action was now held to be invalid, and the one month
requirement of 73 (a) was nonetheless held to be valid,
the '"'"anZyverden's would be completely deprived of
a right to appeal. Such a determination would clearly
"modify" and "abridge" the rights of the Van Zyverdens. It is submitted, however, that the whole argument is ridiculous. To hold otherwise would give procedural problems the status of substantive rights and
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'\'ould pull a thread that \Vould unravel the
of the Utah Rules of l~ivil Procedure.

\\~hole

fabric

The new procedure does not affect anyone's substantive rights in any 'vay except that it provides tnachinery to resolve them more justly, more speedily, and
less expensively. Both the problems of time of filing
and questions of how particular matters can be brought
before the Court are clearly procedural tnatters and
not substantive ones. 'l,he outcome of a case on the
Inerits is not going to be affected by the fact that an
appeal n1ust no'v be filed in one month instead of the
DO days, six n1onths, or a year permitted by former
practice; or by the faet that a cross appeal can be filed
after the one n1onth pero:d (but still less than 90 days) ;
or by the fact that the cross appellant does not have
to file a bond.
Rule 73 (c), which requires a bond on appeal, does
not and should not apply to cross appeals. The purpose
of the bond is to protect parties from spurious, harrassing, or financially irresponsible appeals. 'Vhen an
original appellant has already brought the matter before the Supre1ne Court and posted bond, additional
cost burdens are not likely going to be created by the
consideration of a cross appeal. Rule 7 4 (b), which
creates the procedural concept of cross appeal, makes
no bond requirement. It is clear that case law prior
to the rules 'vhich dealt with "cross appeals" that were
procedurally and practically no different from regular
appeals is not applicable to the new "cross appeal"
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created by Rule 74 (b). Since a cross appeal is not an
appeal, Rule 6 (b) on enlargement of time is applicable
to cross appeals and Rule 73 (a), ''lrhich deals only with
appeals, does not apply.
Neither the la'v nor the concept of the rules justifies an acceptance of the appellant's attack on the rules
or its attack on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to consider the cross appeal.

POINT II.
VAN ZYVERDEN'S CLAIM FOR RELIE~_,
IS SUPPORTED BY THJ~ E-VIDENCE.
In their reply brief, the defendant concedes that
the plaintiff's case is based on the meaning of the contract provision 'vhich states that the Hi-Land milk
base can be exchanged for livestock or horses of equal
value.
The problem of construing contract language has
been confronted many times by the Supreme Court of
Utah. Even experienced lawyers experience difficulty
in drafting contracts with the absolute precision that
is often necessary to avoid lawsuits. A certain degree
of ambiguity is present in every written document and
especially, as here, in documents drafted by parties only
casually acquainted with the law. As has been said, the
heart of this lawsuit is to determine the intentions of
the parties. Their conduct and the language they adopted are equally relevant in determining such intentions.
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Seagull argues that the \"'an Zyverdens are seeking
to Hreform" the contract by parol. This is not so. \"'an
Zyverdens do insist that the trial court should have
been primarily concerned \\·ith the intent of the parties
as evidenced by the contract, the facts surrounding the
CL~'ccution of the contract, and by the interpretation
\vhich the parties themselves place upon it. Case }a,\·
eited by Seagull to the effect that the court 'viii not
consider external evidence inconsistent with the working of the contract is not here applicable.
The fact that there is argument over the meaning
of the representation in the contract is evidence of some
degree of atnbiguity. The language of this court in
lJ'lelford State Bank v. Westfield Canal Irrigation
Company (1945} 108 Ut. 528, 162 P(2d} 101, is par-

ticularly appropriate:
''The disagreement of the parties interested
clearly shows that the contract involved is ambiguous and "·ithout extrinsic evidence the true
intentions of the parties cannot be determined."

In Western Developnzcnt Company v. ?\;ell (1955}
4 t_rt. (2d) 112, 288 P (2d) 452, this Court held that
intention of the parties' controls and "·here that intention can be discovered from the instrument that the
Court will not invoke arbitrary rules of construction.
The Court approved the consideration of extrinsic
evidence to assist in determining the intent of the language of the instrument, and the Court further held
that proof of intent of a different meaning than the
usual ~meani1tg of the words -r.oas permissible.
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In Maw v. Noble (1960) 10 Ut. (2d) 440, 354 I)
(2d) 121, the Court stated:
"The primary and a more fundamental rule
is that the contract must be looked at realistically
in the light of the circumstances under "\vhich it
was entered into, and if the intent of the parties
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty it
must be given effect."
Seagull spends much time in their brief discussing
various evidentary and speculative considerations (for
example the elaborate speculation on pages 9 and 10
of reply brief of what the Van Zyverdens' proof of
loss might have shown) that are really not germane to
the issues. The real issue of this case, as they concede,
is whether "can be exchanged" is a warranty.
The Utah law on warranty in real estate contracts
is set out in (1960) Welchman vs. Wood~ 10 Ut.(2d)
325, 353 P (2d) 165. ,-fhe Court quoted the Sales Act
and recognizing that the Sales Act normally deals with
the sale of goods. It stated that the warranty portion
was an accurate statement of property law. This Court
held that a promise or affirmation of fact is an express
warranty if the natural tendency thereof is to induce
and it does induce the party to enter into the transaction.
It is evident that intent is an essential consideration
in any alleged v~rarranty. Only through a consideration
of the surrounding circumstances can a court determine
if a party was induced into purchasing by a representation. Seagull challenges the materiality of the intent
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in an nppurent attetnpt to blur the fact that even
~,urrar's o'vn t('stitnony sup~orts the in1portance of this
representation in eft'ecting the sale. 'l,he \?"an Zyverdens
are not, of course, trying to reform the instrument by
parole as Seagull suggests. 'fhey are only asking this
l,ourt to recog·nize that the evidence sho,vs that (I)
Farrar did make the representation; (2} the tendency
of the representation was of such a nature that its
natural tendency would be to induce the \?"an Zy,·erdens
to buy; ( 3) \Tan Zyverden made certain that the provision "·as in the contract before he agreed to buy and
therefore it did induce him to buy.
Seagull concedes that in spite of the fact that
Farrar represented that the milk base and equipment
could be exchanged that it in fact could not, but they
insist that the \ran Zyverdens had constructive kno,vledge of this fact. Even if that is true, (which Respondents stoutly deny) it does not relieve Farrar or
his assignee, Seagull, from the warranty. A person can
even warrant that things which cannot possibly happen
""ill occur and the 'varrantor by his warranty agrees
to respond in damages for their non-occurrence ( fV elchma,n vs. Wood~ supra).
Seagull alleges that since 'Tan Zyverden 'vas the
one ,vho inserted the provisions that it must be construed against him. That is not an accurate statement
of the la"·· This Court held in (1960} Maw vs. Noble~
10 Ut. (2d) 440, 354 P (2d} 121, that the Court should
first consider the surrounding circumstances. Only if
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they cannot determine the intent of the parties from
the surrounding circumstances should the rule of strict
construction be applied against the draftor. Even
though the facts of this case do not justify its application here, it is respectfully submitted that such a rule
should have no application in warranty considerations
at all, since a person who desires a warranty is most
likely to be the one who insists on it being inserted
in a contract. 'l.,o apply an arbitrary rule of law that a
representation could not be a warranty because it was
drafted by the party who sought to rely on it would
seem to defeat the basic purpose of warranties.

POINT THREE: THE VAN ZYVERDENS
SHOULD HAVE BE E N ALLOWED TO
PROVE DAMAGES.
The Van Zyverdens' right to damages is clearly
enunciated in W elchn~an v. Wood_, cited supra, it is in
the language of the Court,
"A person may "\varrant the occurrence of
future events or of events which could not possibly happen. The substance of such a warranty
is in effect a pronLise to respond in damages proximately caused by the non-existence of a represented fact." (Emphasis added).

It is clear that rule of Hadley v. Baxendale_, 'vhich
is elaborated in the 'ran Zyverdens' earlier brief, is·
applicable in Utah. ln Pacific Coa·st Title Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Ace. & Ind. L 0. (1958) 7 Ut. (2d) 377, 325
P. (~d) 906, this Court .stated the rule as follows:
1
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"The rule ns to \vhat damages are recoverable
for breuch of contract is based upon the concept
of reasonable foreseeability that loss of such
general character \vould result fron1 the breach.
'fherefore, to be compensable, the loss n1ust result fron1 the breach in the natural and usual
course of events, so that it can fairly and reasonably be said that if the minds of the parties had
adverted to breach when the contract \vas made,
loss of such character would have been within
their contemplation."
'fhe 'ran Zyverdens should ha ,. e been allowed to
put on proof of loss of profits. The Utah la"· on this
point is stated in (1960) Jenl1·ins v. 1lloryan, 12:3 Ut.
480, 260 P(2d} 532:

"Prospective profits to be derived from a business which is not yet established, but n1erely in
conte1nplation are generally too uncertain and
speculative to forn1 a basis for recovery.
[but]
... the language of Rule 73 (d) allowing damages for delay may in a proper case permit compensation for some increased beneficial use where
the objection as to the e1tterprise~s speculative
character is overco1ne by compete·nt proof.n
(Emphasis added) .
This language clearly shows that loss of profits
in a prospective business are recoverable if they are
proven.
It will be noted that the Court rejected the offer
of proof, not as incompetent proof, but on the mistaken
theory that such damages were not recoverable. It is
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this error that requires reversal on the portion of the
case respecting damages.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Respondent's cross-appeal complies with the applicable rules of this court as they are presently constituted. The substantive rights of the appeal are not
affected by the changes in the procedural requirements
incident to cross-appeals. 'I" he authorities cited by the
appellants under the old statutes are not applicable.
The authorities cited by the appellants overlook
the fact that the primary concern of courts in the construction of contracts is to determine the intention of
the parties. Particularly in the light of Welchman v.
Wood_, it is apparent that the parties intended that the
seller was warranting the fact that the milk base could
be exchanged. Seagull must be made to respond in
damages for the non-occurrence of the event which was
warranted. All of the damages sustained by the "\ran
Zyverdens, including the reasonably justifiable loss of
profits, are recoverable by them and should be offset
against any liability to the sellers under the agreement.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMI'.fTED, this lith
day of December, 1963.
GEORGE M. l\1cMILLAN and
V. RENE NELSON
Attorneys for Appellant
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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